

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

CVC-11/416-13  
(EFV:jge)  
Ser: OLI  
20 April 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN  
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Subj: Action Report, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN for period of 17 March 1952 through 18 April 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 of 1 July 1951  
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), this report is submitted for inclusion in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

PART I - MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The mission of Carrier Air Group ELEVEN is derived from CTF-77 Secret Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd revision). It consists primarily of rail interdiction against the North Korean railroad network. It consists also of interdiction against the enemy's transportation, communication, industrial and supply facilities. Early morning and night Hecklers, Armed Reconnaissance, Photo Reconnaissance, and Naval Gunfire Spot missions were flown in support of the overall interdiction program. Defensive missions consisted of ASP and C.I.

COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT			PILOTS		
		3/17	3/31	4/18	3/17	3/31	4/18
CVC-11 CDR J. W. ONSTOTT	None	-	-	-	7	7	7**
VF-112 CDR J. V. ROWNEY	F9F-2	17	17	17	24	24	24
VC-61 (Det. "C") LCDR R. L. NALL	F9F-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4
VF-113 LCDR J. R. STRANE	F4U-4	18	18	18	26	26	26*
VF-114 LCDR G. D. BJORNSON	F4U-4	18	17	16	26*	26*	26**
VC-3 (Det. "C") LCDR A. G. RUSSELL	F4U-5N	4	2#	1	4	5	5
VA-115 CDR C. H. CARR	AD-4 AD-4L	11 2	9 2	8 1	26	26	26
VC-11 (Det. "C") LCDR R. D. BOTTEN	AD-4W	3	3	3	5 (Crews) 4	5 4	5 4
VC-25 (Det. "C") LT F. D. HOOKS	AD-4NL AD-2Q	3 1	3 1	3 1	6 (Crews) 6	6 6	6 6

\* One pilot on emergency leave is included in this figure

\*\* One pilot in hospital is included in this figure

# One of the two aircraft was borrowed from the VC-3 detachment, USS BOXER, on 6 April and returned on 15 April

SECURITY INFORMATION

## PART II - CHRONOLOGY

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with Carrier Air Group ELEVEN embarked remained at Yokosuka as ready carrier from 22 February to 17 March 1952 except for three (3) days operations to the south of Yokosuka for the purpose of refresher air operations. Due to inclement weather, only 132 sorties were flown during the three days.

17 March - Departed Yokosuka to join Task Force 77 off the east coast of Korea. No air operations conducted.

18 March - Enroute to Task Force 77. No air operations conducted.

19 March - The PHILIPPINE SEA took station in Task Force 77 at 1005I this date. Three Marine helicopters were launched for K-18. No other air operations conducted due to inclement weather.

20 March - Commenced air operations over northeastern Korea once again in support of the rail interdiction being conducted against the enemy by this force. Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Heckler, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 91, total rounds of ammunition expended 7,300 (20 MM)/ 14,600 (50 Cal.), total rockets fired 4, total bombs dropped 60 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 31 rail cuts, 5 boxcars damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 highway by-pass destroyed, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 1 small shipyard installation damaged and 58 small craft damaged.

21 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 97, total rounds of ammunition expended 6,500 (20 MM)/ 18,600 (50 Cal.), no rockets, total bombs dropped 59.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 48 rail cuts, 1 railroad car destroyed, 5 warehouses destroyed and 4 damaged, 7 buildings destroyed, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, and 1 storage area damaged.

ENS E. A. BERNARD, VF-114, ditched his Corsair in Wonsan Harbor when the oil line of his aircraft was hit by flak while he was flying along the coast just south of Hungnam. He was rescued by a helicopter from the LST 799.

22 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 87, total rounds of ammunition expended 6,300 (20 MM)/ 21,900 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 65.3 tons, total napalm dropped 5.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 39 railcuts, 1 railroad car destroyed and 3 damaged, 2 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 5 buildings destroyed and 12 damaged, 5 warehouses destroyed and 5 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass damaged and 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 span dropped.

23 March - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

24 March - No air operations conducted due to inclement weather.

25 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, NGF, and one prop strike. Due to large swells, air operations were restricted to prop type aircraft. There was a limited amount of flights this day because of sea conditions. Total sorties 24, total rounds of ammunition expended 3,800 (20 MM)/ 11,300 (50 Cal.) total bombs dropped 23 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 10 rail cuts, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 6 damaged, and 35 small boats damaged.

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26 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Heckler, Photo, two jet strikes and four prop strikes. Total sorties 86, total rounds of ammunition expended 5,300 (20 MM)/ 11,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 74 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 43 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 highway bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 3 trucks destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 AA positions destroyed and 50 small boats damaged.

27 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, NGF, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties ninety (90), total rounds of ammunition 13,800 (20 MM)/ 10,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 64 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 47 rail cuts, 1 locomotive destroyed, 1 boxcar destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 truck destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 4 damaged, 1 AA position destroyed, 23 troops killed or wounded and 2 small boats destroyed, 59 damaged.

ICLR A. G. RUSSELL, VC-3 Det "C", ditched his F4U-5N in Wonsan Harbor at night when he developed engine trouble, probably caused by AA hit in the engine sector. He was rescued by a destroyer, the USS BRINKLEY BASS (LD-887).

ENS F. S. DUNNING, VC-3 Det "C" struck the ramp with his landing gear during a night recovery. The aircraft was a strike, ENS DUNNING was uninjured.

28 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 90, total rounds of ammunition expended 4,800 (20 MM)/ 17,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 31 railcuts, 2 trucks damaged, 7 buildings destroyed, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed and 40 small boats damaged.

29 March - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

30 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and four prop strikes. Total sorties 95, total ammunition expended 14,100 (20 MM)/ 43,700 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 66.5 tons, total napalm dropped 4.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 24 railcuts, 4 boxcars destroyed and 20 damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, 23 troops killed or wounded, 14 buildings destroyed and 16 damaged, 30 fuel drums destroyed, 8 AA positions damaged, 12 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 3 warehouses destroyed and 31 small boats damaged.

LTJG W. J. COOPER, VC-3 Det "C", developed a flash fire in his cockpit shortly after take-off early in the morning before first light and flew his plane into the water. He was rescued by the destroyer, the USS IDWY (ID770)

31 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike, and three prop strikes. Total sorties 91, total rounds of ammunition expended 12,400 (20 MM)/ 23,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 67.3 tons, total napalm dropped .8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 61 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed, 1 locomotive damaged, 1 locomotive shelter damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed and 1 damaged, 2 warehouses destroyed, 4 buildings damaged, 3 troops killed or wounded and 42 small boats damaged.

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1 April - Air operations, which were delayed until 1000 because of weather, consisted of the usual ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 90, total ammunition expended 4,800 (20 MM)/ 8,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 61.3 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 39 railcuts, 2 boxcars destroyed and 3 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed, 1 truck destroyed, 4 AA positions destroyed and 1 damaged, 13 buildings destroyed, 6 troops killed or wounded and eighteen 18 small boats damaged.

2 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

3 April - Air operations against the enemy in northeast Korea consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 89, total ammunition expended 6,100 (20 MM)/ 26,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 66.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 18 railcuts, 5 buildings destroyed and 11 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 15 troops killed or wounded, 2 AA positions destroyed and 3 damaged, 1 truck destroyed, 1 armored car damaged.

LTJG John LE GOENE ditched his AD approximately 10 miles from the Force when his engine failed. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47).

4 April - Air operations were limited due to low overcast over target areas. Operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Recco, Photo, and three prop strikes. Total sorties 66, total rounds of ammunition expended 2,700 (20 MM)/ 15,200 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 35 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 17 rail cuts, 23 railroad cars damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed, 1 railroad bypass destroyed, 1 highway bridge damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 2 damaged, 2 tanks damaged, 1 AA position destroyed, 10 troops killed or wounded and 1 boat damaged.

LTJG W. R. CARTER received lacerations about the face when an AA shell burst shattered his canopy. He landed safely at K-18.

5 April - Air operations consisted of the usual ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGE, six photo Reccos, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 83, total rounds of ammunition expended 5,500 (20 MM)/ 19,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 53.5 tons, total napalm dropped .8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 32 rail cuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed 2 railroad by-passes damaged, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 24 damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, 1 warehouse damaged, 2 buildings destroyed. Four trucks damaged, and 1 fuel dump destroyed.

6 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

7 April - Air operations against the enemy in Northeast Korea continued with ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, Jet reccos, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 94, total rounds of ammunition expended 14,700 (20 MM)/ 46,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 62.5 tons, total napalm dropped 8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 60 rail cuts, 1 locomotive damaged, 9 railroad car destroyed and 38 damaged, 10 trucks destroyed and 5 damaged, 23 buildings destroyed and 24 damaged, 1 AA position destroyed and 1 damaged, 6 high tension towers damaged, 17 troops killed or wounded, 1 jeep destroyed and 18 small boats damaged.

8 April - No air operations conducted due to fog.

9 April - No air operations conducted due to fog.

10 April - Air operations commenced again with ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, NGF, jet recco, three jet strikes and four prop strikes. Total sorties 100, total rounds of ammunition expended 12,000 (20 MM)/ 13,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 56.3 tons, total napalm dropped 13.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 23 railcuts, 1 locomotive damaged, 5 railroad cars destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 1 truck destroyed and 1 damaged, 8 buildings destroyed and 13 damaged, 1 high tension tower damaged, 15 troops killed or wounded and 3 small boats sunk.

LCMR G. B. BJORNSON, CO VF-114, flew into the water shortly after take off when he ran to the slip stream of the aircraft ahead while at a very low altitude. He was rescued by the ship's helicopter.

LTJG P. S. SWANSON, VA-115, ditched his AD-4 in Wonsan Harbor when his plane was hit by AA in the vicinity of Wonsan. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS ST PAUL (CA-73)

11 April - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGF, four jet reccos, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 72, total rounds of ammunition expended 9,500 (20 MM)/ 32,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 46.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 26 railcuts, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 12 damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed and 3 damaged, 18 trucks destroyed and 10 damaged, 7 buildings destroyed and 9 damaged, 1 transformer station damaged, 10 troops killed or wounded, and 15 small boats damaged.

12 April - Force Replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

13 April - Today this force gave the enemy an Easter Sunday Punch. The Air Group conducted two group strikes on Chongjin of maximum effort, and Air Group Two in the BOXER conducted two similar strikes. These were the first group strikes of World War II vintage that Air Group ELEVEN has executed against enemy targets in Korea. Total sorties 110, total rounds of ammunition expended 3,100 (20 MM)/ 3,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 95.8 tons, total napalm dropped 3.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 7 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 3 railroad by-passes damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 2 cranes damaged, 5 railroad cars damaged, 1 radio tower damaged, 1 truck damaged, 33 buildings destroyed and 5 damaged, and 2 small boats damaged.

14 April - The force returned to its former operating area after yesterday's strikes on Chongjin, and continued rail interdiction. Air operations same as before - ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGF, Photo, three jet reccos and four prop strikes. Total sorties 82, total rounds of ammunition expended 9,500 (20 MM)/ 32,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 40 railcuts, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 3 high tension line towers damaged, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 10 damaged, 4 supply dumps damaged, 2 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 4 warehouses destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 17 damaged, and 9 small boats damaged.

15 April - Air operations against enemy targets were hampered by low broken clouds in most areas. However, the following damage was inflicted in the enemy: 32 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 1 large boaterane destroyed, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 16 damaged, 1 jeep destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 3 damaged, 10 troops killed or wounded, and 2 small boats destroyed, and 6 damaged.

16 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations. USS PHILIPPINE SEA left the Line; enroute to Yokosuka.

17 April - Enroute to Yokosuka. No air operations.

PART III - ORDNANCE

1. Comments on Ordnance Equipment

F4U-4

a. Air Group ELEVEN recently completed the installation of Aircraft Service Change 432 in 36 F4U-4 aircraft, during the ship's last inport period. A Vought representative made himself available to this air group to familiarize personnel with the installation of this change.

b. Two and one half days after the indoctrination of a twelve man crew, the first aircraft with the change installed was completed, and checked satisfactorily. Personnel from the AD and F9F squadrons were given instructions also. With the additional personnel, each F4U squadron was able to work on six aircraft at a time on a production line basis. Thirty four F4U-4 aircraft were fitted with Change 432 within a period of three weeks from the time the change kits were received on board.

c. The AERO 11A bomb rack is a tremendous improvement over the old MK V installation. However, the following difficulties have been encountered in actual operations:

(1) On one occasion the No. 5 station bomb rack sheared off while the aircraft was being towed aft for respot on the flight deck. The bomb rack was loaded with a 250 lb. GP bomb. An RULM was submitted by VF-113

(2) Due to the extreme deflection of the loaded bomb rack, considerable stress has been placed on the bolt that affixes the bomb rack to the wing. This has caused the bolt to "work" which in turn has necessitated constant checking of the bomb racks for looseness.

(3) Four breakages of the sway brace support occurred. In each case, failure occurred when the rack was loaded with wings in the fold position. RU DAOE was submitted by VF-114.

d. Aircraft Service Change No. 416 has not been incorporated in any of the F4U's assigned to this air group. Therefore, the buffeting of the folded wings in slipstream prior to launch may later have an adverse effect upon aircraft with the AERO 11A installation.

e. This air group has not fired any rockets since the installation of the AERO 11A.

AD-4

a. A total of 78,545 rounds of (20 MM) were fired, an average of 1785.1 rounds per gun. It was found that failure of the hydraulic system, gun charger etc. caused the most failures to fire. A total of 21, which includes suspect back pressure and improper lubricant.

b. It was found that once the initial round was fired, the operation was very good. A total of 33 malfunctions caused stoppages after the initial round was fired. They are as follows:

- (1) Feed operating lever disengaged - 2
- (2) Driving spring guide disengaged - 1
- (3) Calibration - 2
- (4) Faulty or dud ammo - 8  
Failure to extract - 8
- (5) Link jam - 7



(6) Failure of breech back lock - 3

(7) Tension, jammed belt, lost tension  
or the feed mechanism - 2

c. Omitting hydraulic charger, suspected back pressure and human error malfunctions, Attack Squadron 115 averaged approximately 3000 rounds per stoppage. The ship's supply did not carry enough E-51 univis or AXS 777 to provide maximum lubrication and upkeep.

F9F-2

a. In addition to firing over 66,00 rounds of (20 MM) ammunition since the last report, the squadron has dropped 914 bombs which required 1498 fuses. The following is a breakdown of the types of bombs and fuses expended: 319-100# GP, 567-250# GP, and 28-500# GP bombs; 840 AN-M139 Nose, 574 AN-M101A2 Tail and 84 T50E4 VT Nose fuses.

b. The number of sorties flown, and the heavy bomb and fusing schedule makes it almost impossible to do any more than reload and clear simple gun stoppages between flights. The long work day of the ordnancemen will make it necessary to initiate an ordnance night check crew in order to maintain the guns in satisfactory condition for sustained operations. This will only be possible if there is an increase in the ordnance department allowance, since none of the men can be spared from the day operations.

c. Twelve bombs hung or released improperly from MK55 bomb racks. There were two reasons for the malfunctions. The squadron attempted to keep the wings as clean as possible for increased performance, so removed and reinstalled the racks every flight according to the number of bombs carried. Partly because of the rush between flights, and partly because of the flimsy construction of the airplane receptacles, many of the electrical connections on the airplane and many of the plug prongs on the MK55 racks were damaged to the point of failure; see VR-114, INJURY 38-52 dtd 5 April 1952. The other reason for hung bombs on the MK55 racks was corrosion of the latch frame assembly which retarded the releasing action of the suspension lug. The racks are no longer removed between flights, and the latch assembly is periodically oiled and greased. Therefore, no recent failures have been experienced.

d. The ship's supply of low temperature gun oil and charger springs was depleted, and the men were forced to use driving springs as a substitute. Most of the charger spring failures were caused by crystallization within the middle four inches of the spring. The leather wipers in the charger piston swell when exposed to hydrolube and bind against the sides of the cylinder. Many stoppages that occurred seemed to be intermittent electrical failures, but because of the complexity of the charging system, still remain unexplained. The following is a breakdown of the types of stoppages encountered this tour: Total stoppages, 80; light struck primers, 29; undetermined (electric hydraulic charging system), 30; jams, 10; miscellaneous, 11. The charging system accounted for 74% of the trouble with the (20 MM) gun and is considered unsatisfactory.

2. Ordnance Expenditures

<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
2000 # GP	Mar	0	0	0	0
	Apr	0	0	27	27
		<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>
1000 # GP	Mar	0	34	329	363
	Apr	0	154	243	397
		<u>0</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>572</u>	<u>760</u>
500 # GP	Mar	0	226	14	240
	Apr	28	321	9	358
		<u>28</u>	<u>507</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>598</u>

<u>Ordinance</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
260 # Frag	Mar	0	42	16	28
	Apr	0	206	20	226
		<u>0</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>284</u>
250 # GP	Mar	110	917	1040	2067
	Apr	457	219	822	1528
		<u>567</u>	<u>1166</u>	<u>1862</u>	<u>3595</u>
100 # GP	Mar	136	192	78	406
	Apr	183	1268	4	1647
		<u>319</u>	<u>1460</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>2053</u>
5" HVARS	Mar	0	4	0	4
	Apr	0	0	0	0
		<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
Napalm Tanks (Full)	Mar	0	29	12	41
	Apr	0	10	32	42
		<u>0</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>83</u>
20 MM	Mar	19037	4935	43385	67357
	Apr	47293	4580	43385	95258
		<u>66330</u>	<u>9515</u>	<u>86770</u>	<u>162615</u>
50 Cal.	Mar	0	213510	0	213510
	Apr	0	369716	0	369716
		<u>0</u>	<u>583226</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>583226</u>
MK 6 Flares	Mar	0	48	54	102
	Apr	0	20	32	52
		<u>0</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>154</u>
MK 8 Flares	Mar	0	0	8	8
	Apr	0	0	20	20
		<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Battle Damage to Enemy

	<u>March</u>		<u>April</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>
Railcuts		334		292		626
Locomotives	1	2	1	2	2	4
Railroad Cars	13	36	32	133	45	169
Railroad Bridges	8	6	8	7	16	13
Railroad By-passes	2	4	3	7	5	11
Tanks	0	0	0	2	0	2
Trucks	18	9	35	25	53	34
Warehouses	15	9	4	1	19	10
Buildings	36	48	88	84	135	132
Storage Dumps	0	1	0	4	0	5
Fuel Dumps	0	0	1	0	1	0



	<u>March</u>		<u>April</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>
Highway Bridges	1	2	1	4	2	6
Highway By-passes	8	0	0	0	8	0
Locomotive Shelter	0	1	0	0	0	1
Shipyard	0	1	0	0	0	1
AA Positions	5	8	8	5	13	13
Troops	0	49	0	85	0	134
Small Boats	2	315	5	69	7	384
High Tension Wire Towers	0	0	0	11	0	11
Cranes	0	0	1	2	1	2

## 2. Battle Damage to Own Aircraft

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Location</u>
VF-112	27 Mar	F9F-2	127130	Small Arms Fire	Port Stabilizer & Rudder
	1 Apr	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing & Flap
	4 Apr	F9F-2	127197	Flack	Canopy & Windshild
	4 Apr	F9F-2	127130	Flack	Port Wing & Flap
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127202	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side Fuselage
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127209	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127130	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Bomb Rack
	10 Apr	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	10 Apr	F9F-2	127201	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	14 Apr	F9F-2	127205	Flack	Fuselage & Port & Stbd Wings
	15 Apr	F9F-2	127179	Flack	Port Wing
	15 Apr	F9F-2	127195	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
VF-113	20 Mar	F4U-4	81176	Flack	Stbd Wing & Port Stabilizer
	21 Mar	F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	22 Mar	F4U-4	80827	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
	22 Mar	F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Empenage
	27 Mar	F4U-4	81306	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well
	27 Mar	F4U-4	81037	Flack	Stbd Wing
	30 Mar	F4U-4	81317	Flack	Port Wing
	30 Mar	F4U-4	97106	Flack	Belly Tank & Port Wing Stub
	30 Mar	F4U-4	81835	Flack	Empenage
	30 Mar	F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Main Fuel Cell
	1 Apr	F4U-4	80948	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side Fuselage
	3 Apr	F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Rudder
	3 Apr	F4U-4	81176	Small Arms Fire	Hyd System
	4 Apr	F4U-4	82170	Flack	Canopy
	7 Apr	F4U-4	80948	Small Arms Fire	Port&Stbd Stabilizer & Port Elevator
	7 Apr	F4U-4	81835	Small Arms Fire	Empenage
	7 Apr	F4U-4	97179	Bomb Blast	
	10 Apr	F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring & Cylinder
	13 Apr	F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Port Stabilizer
	13 Apr	F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Accessory Cowling
	14 Apr	F4U-4	81152	Flack	Port Wing
	14 Apr	F4U-4	97179	Flack	Port & Stbd Wing Stubs
	15 Apr	F4U-4	81176	Flack	Port Wing
	15 Apr	F4U-4	81251	Small Arms Fire	

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Location</u>
VF-114	20 Mar	F4U-4	81784	Flack	Accessory Section (Oil loss)
				(Plane ditched at Sea)	
	26 Mar	F4U-4	81443	Flack	Fuselage & Wheel Well
	31 Mar	F4U-4	80848	Flack	Fuselage
	3 Apr	F4U-4	80877	Flack	Empenage & Stbd Wing
	5 Apr	F4U-4	80845	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub
	10 Apr	F4U-4	97201	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank & Wheel Well
	11 Apr	F4U-4	81219	Flack	Port Flap
	11 Apr	F4U-4	97191	Flack	Port Wing
	15 Apr	F4U-4	80822	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
VA-115	20 Mar	AD-4	127875	Flack & S. Arms Fire	Stbd Wing & Fuselage
	21 Mar	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage & Stbd Dive Brake
	22 Mar	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	25 Mar	AD-4	123995	Flack	Port Wing
	25 Mar	AD-4	123984	Flack	Port Dive Brake
	28 Mar	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Cowling
	28 Mar	AD-4	127863	Flack	Port & Stbd Stabilizer
	28 Mar	AD-4	127862	Flack	Stbd Wing
	30 Mar	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Rudder Stbd Flap & Port Wing
	30 Mar	AD-4	128922	Flack	Port Wing & Port Wheel Well
	30 Mar	AD-4	127878	Flack	Port Wing
	31 Mar	AD-4	123984	Flack	Speed Ring
	31 Mar	AD-4	127877	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	1 Apr	AD-4	127861	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring & Stbd Wing
	3 Apr	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring
	3 Apr	AD-4	127878	Flack	Port Stabilizer
	3 Apr	AD-4	128922	Flack	Stbd Wing & Port Flap & Port Elevator
	4 Apr	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring
	5 Apr	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Port Elevator
	7 Apr	AD-4	127865	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing & Aileron
	10 Apr	AD-4	127863	Small Arms Fire	Oil Cooler
				(Plane ditched at Sea)	
	10 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Flap
	11 Apr	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage
	13 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	13 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub
	13 Apr	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage
	14 Apr	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub & Stbd Stabilizer
	15 Apr	AD-4	127865	Small Arms Fire	Rudder
	15 Apr	AD-4	127861	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	15 Apr	AD-4	127874	Flack	Port Elevator
VC-3 Det. "C"	7 Apr	F4U-5N	122185	Small Arms Fire	Prop & Speed Ring
VC-35 Det. "C"	11 Apr	AD-4NL	124747	Flack	Fuselage
	11 Apr	AD-4NL	124749	Flack	Fuselage & Horizontal Stabilizer

### 3. Loss of Own Aircraft Due to Operational Causes

<u>Date</u>	<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>
27 Mar	F4U-4N	124722	Engine Failure - ditched at sea
30 Mar	F4U-5N	122017	Fire in Cockpit - ditched at sea
3 Apr	AD-4	123984	Engine failure - ditched at sea
10 Apr	F4U-4	96958	Crashed at sea shortly after take off due to slip stream

## PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel Performance

a. Medical report of air group personnel will be found in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA for the same period under the above heading.

b. Squadron Comments:

(1) VF-112 - Performance Satisfactory

(2) VF-113 - It is recommended that the enlisted personnel allowance for VF-113 for pay grades E-2 and E-3 of the Group IX ratings (non-rated) be increased from 42 to 50 men. These additional eight men are considered necessary to relieve the shortages of men caused by the delay in replacements. Non-rated men under supervision can temporarily fulfill critical jobs when the reliefs are slow in arriving in the forward area.

It is further recommended that activities under the ~~composition~~ of Air Pac, operating in WESPAC, submit to ComAirPac a list of expected losses of personnel by transfer for the next quarter. This list should include the expected date of transfer, destination, and rate of personnel. Such a report could be used as a basis for furnishing reliefs for men who are expected to be transferred to shore duty or for separation, etc.

(3) VF-114 - Performance Satisfactory

(4) VA-115 - Performance Satisfactory

(5) VC-3 - Performance Satisfactory

(6) VC-11 - Morale remained high, performance of officer and men was very satisfactory.

(7) VC-35 - Performance Satisfactory

(8) VC-61 - Performance Satisfactory

2. Casualties

a. ENS E. A. BERNARD, 506693, USN, VF-114

On 20 March 1952, ENS BERNARD's F4U-4 was hit by an explosive shell just south of Hangnam which put three holes in the cockpit and punctured the oil tank. He was forced to ditch about 15 miles North of Yodo Island. He received no injuries and was rescued by the helicopter from the LST 799.

b. LCDR A. G. RUSSELL, 99731, USN, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 27 March 1952, LCDR RUSSELL's F4U-5N was hit by ground fire while on a night heckler mission. Which caused engine malfunction. He was forced to ditch his plane in Wonsan Harbor and was rescued by the USS BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887). He suffered no injuries.

c. ENS F. S. DUNNING Jr., 508354, USN, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 27 March 1952, ENS DUNNING's F4U-5N struck the ramp upon making a night landing. The plane ended up a strike, but ENS DUNNING received no injuries, except for being shaken up.

d. LTJG W. J. COOPER, 478099, USNR, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 30 March 1952, just after LTJG COOPER was launched on an early morning heckler mission a electrical fire developed in the cockpit which temporarily blinded him, and he flew his F4U-5N into the water. The napalm he was carrying exploded. However, LTJG COOPER was rescued by the USS LOWERY (DD-770) having received only very minor burns about the face.

e. LTJG J. DE GOEDE, 513000, USN, VA-115.

On 3 April 1952, LTJG DE GOEDE's AD-4 developed engine trouble shortly after leaving the task force on a strike mission. He attempted to return to the ship, but the engine failed, and he was forced to ditch his aircraft 10 miles NW of the force. He was rescued by the helicopter. He suffered no injuries.

f. LTJG W. R. CARTER, 485995, USN, CAG-11.

On 4 April 1952, LTJG CARTER received multiple lacerations about the face when an AA shell exploded nearby and shattered his canopy of his F9F-2. With the assistance of his wingman to help guide him, LTJG CARTER made an normal landing at K-18 and was admitted to the hospital ship, USS HAVEN, for treatment. His return to duty will be approximately 20 March 1952.

g. LCDR G. B. BJORNSON, 98495, USN, VF-114.

On 10 April 1952, LCDR BJORNSON ran into the slip stream of an aircraft ahead just after he had taken off with his F4U-4 heavily loaded with bombs and napalm. At that low altitude he was unable to regain control of the Corsair before hitting the water. His napalm exploded, but he managed to stay clear of the fire until rescued by the ship's helicopter. He received lacerations about the head, legs, and arms, and broke his right knee cap. He also suffered from mild exposure because his MK III exposure suit was torn in three places. His return to duty is estimated to be 25 May 1952.

h. LTJG P. S. SWANSON, 521907, USN, VA-115.

On 10 April 1952, LTJG SWANSON's AD-4 was hit by AA in the vicinity of Wonsan, and he was forced to ditch his aircraft in Wonsan Harbor. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS ST PAUL (CA-73) with out delay. He received no injuries.

#### PART VI - OPERATIONS

##### 1. F4U-4

a. Most rail strikes consisted of 4-8 F4U's and 4-8 AD's. All aircraft proceed to the assigned target area together. It has been found that in areas where little or no flack is likely to be encountered, it is desirable to split the combination between the AD's and the F4U's, each group taking a preassigned section of track to work on. In cases where there are 8 F4U's assigned, these can be a further split into two 4 plane divisions, each assigned to a different section of track. A 4 plane division is considered the ideal number to work over a section of track for rail cutting when no flack is encountered. It is highly desirable to take photographs of a section of track that is to be cut, both before and after the attack is made. In some cases, there is an AD-4 with a K-25 camera attached to take photographs after an attack. However, in view of the above, it is recommended that the K-25 camera and attachment be made available to the F4U's squadrons, so that additional pictures for accurate damage assessment may be taken.

b. It is believed that the installation of the AERO 11A bomb rack has had some effect on the flight characteristics of the F4U-4. Some pilots have noted a tendency of the aircraft to roll to the port at speeds in excess of 300 knots. Others have noticed a loss of aileron control at slower speeds approaching a stall condition. Additional maintenance has been required in checking torque tube linkage and trim of the aircraft. It is believed that the above conditions are not applicable to all F4U-4 aircraft having the AERO 11A installation.

## 2. Flu-5N

a. During April, pilots of the VC-3 Det. flew with VF-113 and VF-114 in order to maintain flight proficiency, due to the loss of own aircraft in rapid succession.

b. It is noted that all gun camera film exposed to date at night has failed to produce any intelligible results. The film was exposed under the varying light conditions found between sunset and sunrise, with and without flares. It seems obvious that the Super XX film (Index 100) is too slow for such adverse lighting conditions. It is recommended that this subject be reviewed by interested activities and that efforts be made to provide film suitable for night fighter missions.

## 3. AD-4

a. Tactics employed during the period of this report were the same as were used, and commented on, in the last action report. Coordination between jets, prop VF and VA squadrons continues to improve. In addition, there was marked increase in bombing accuracy.

b. As will be noted in other paragraphs of this report, operations of the VA squadron were considerably hampered by lack of replacement aircraft. At the end of this period Attack Squadron 115 had only five operational aircraft, with five replacements in sight, but not yet delivered.

c. For Attack Squadron 115, the K-25 camera has come of age. Improved maintenance, better servicing, and increased knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the K-25 has resulted in overall excellent results. The value of photographs taken immediately after a strike cannot be overstressed. With photo coverage, there can be no doubt of the damage inflicted, and the knowledge that photographs will be taken has been an incentive to pilots to make every effort to get that "hit". Within Attack Squadron 115 a photo plane is launched with each strike group. This plane then makes a photo run after all ordnance runs have been completed. Coverage has been excellent and is improving with each strike.

## 4. Comments on MK III Exposure Suit by VA-115

a. During this combat tour Attack Squadron 115 lost three aircraft due to engine failure. All three of the aircraft were ~~successfully ditched in water of~~ temperature ranging from 42 degrees to 60 degrees. Two of the three pilots were wearing MK III Exposure suits and made full and successful use of them.

(1) LTJG Stanford BAINFORTH ditched in the inland waters off the coast of Japan. The water temperature was 60 degrees and the air temperature was approximately 68 degrees. This pilot was not wearing an exposure suit. However, full use of Mae West and life raft were made. Due to the higher water temperatures in around the southern coast of Japan, the exposure suit was not deemed necessary.

(2) LTJG John DE GOEDE ditched his aircraft approximately fifteen miles from the Task Force while operating off the coast of Korea. The water temperature was reported as 42 degrees and the air temperature was 46 degrees. This pilot experienced considerable difficulty getting himself free of the aircraft which sank immediately due to unexpended bombs. The exposure suit was not torn. However, the cover for the "G" suit adapter hole was loose and it allowed some water to enter the suit. The pilot, when recovered, was wet from the waist down. Despite this, LTJG DE GOEDE did not experience any serious discomfort due to cold. The rubber gloves recommended for use with the MK III exposure suit were not worn on this occasion, with the result that the pilot experienced numbness of the fingers and hands. An air bubble formed in the back of the neck of the exposure suit forcing the pilot's face down into the water. This pressure was relieved by rolling in the water and tugging at the suit. The buoyancy of the suit was sufficient to allow the pilot to reach the surface of the water from a depth of approximately ten feet, while still attached to the parachute, without having to inflate the Mae West. The life raft was not used, for the helicopter recovered the pilot before it became necessary to inflate it.

(3) LTJG Peter SWANSON, ditched in Wonsan Harbor after being hit by AA followed by subsequent loss of oil pressure. The water temperature was reported as 42 degrees and the air temperature as 48 degrees. He experienced no difficulty getting clear of the plane, however he tore the left cuff of his exposure suit in the process. Only the lower part of his shirt sleeve was wet. The buoyancy afforded by the exposure suit was such that only half of the Mae West had to be inflated. The life raft was lost and not used. The rubber gloves and their liner recommended for use with the MK III exposure suit proved to be ample insulation against the cold water; mobility of the fingers was not lost. Warmth and comfort were amply provided by the suit. The pilot only remained in the water for approximately 7 minutes before being picked up by helicopter.

(4) Four other flyers from Air Group ELEVEN ditched their planes during the same period. The temperature of the water varied between 36 degrees and 42 degrees. Of the four MK III exposure suits involved, two functioned perfectly, affording the wearer warmth, comfort and dryness. As for the other two, one of the suits fitted loosely around the neck allowing about two gallons of water to enter. The pilot claims that despite this, the buoyancy provided by the suit was sufficient so that no difficulty was experienced in remaining afloat. The water temperature in this case was 38 degrees, and the pilot remained in the water for approximately thirty minutes, experiencing no extreme discomfort. In the fourth situation the pilot ripped the suit in both knees and both elbows while extricating himself from the plane. Buoyancy was provided by the Mae West only, as the suit was filled with water. The pilot remained in the water approximately ten minutes before being rescued by helicopter. The water temperature was approximately 42 degrees.

(5) In none of the above cases were rubber gloves worn. The pilots involved claimed that they retained enough mobility of the hands and fingers to inflate Mae Wests and adjust the Rescue Sling around themselves, but could do nothing more with the fingers after a few minutes. One pilot couldn't even tear the tab off his dye marker.

(6) It is recommended that pilots wear their rubber gloves. If the warm air temperatures make them uncomfortable, the gloves should be carried in the pockets.

(7) Snaps should be placed on all pockets to keep from losing their contents upon ditching.

## 5. AD-4W

a. During the operating period, 17 March to 18 April, Unit "Charlie" was assigned 70 missions. All missions were accomplished with the exception of those that were cancelled because of weather. Of the 53 missions accomplished, 52 were ASP and the remaining one was a weather recon.

b. Each flight used the AN/APS-20A as air and surface search radar. There was no instance of radar failure in flight. There was one radar failure during pre-launch check on the flight deck. The flight did not launch but the mission was carried out by the AD-4W of Unit "Charlie" that was airborne at that time. This caused the aircraft to be airborne for a total of 4.5 hours. The pilot felt no more fatigued than on a 3 hour flight, but the air controller expressed that he did not feel that he could be as efficient as is required.

c. "Bellhop", AN/ART-26, was utilized on all flights and excellent results were obtained until the ship board antennas became defective. On one instance while escorting an F4U to K-18, the P.O. presentation was satisfactorily received until the AD-4W was at a range of 60 miles and at an altitude of 4,500 feet. It was received intermittently at a range of 80 miles as the aircraft was returning from K-18.

d. "Middleman", AN/ARC-28, was used several times between the strike control ship and the strike aircraft. Excellent communications were maintained between the Force and the strike aircraft with the AD-4W aircraft on station.



e. On March 27, the NASP had an intermittent contact that was also held on the AN/APS-31B of the AD-4NL (Gator). Flares were dropped, but no visual identification would be made. The surface attack unit, consisting of one ED, was vectored to the scene. Investigation by SAU revealed that contact to be a large school of fish.

f. On April 7, the predawn ASP held an intermittent contact that was evaluated as a possible submarine. No positive identification was made. The ASP on the next flight also had unidentified air contacts. The AD-4NL "gator" aircraft was vectored for intercept, but was unable to overtake the bogeys. Visual contact was made, but the excessive range prevented positive identification. The bogeys were described as similar in appearance to an F6F and could possibly have been two EA-9 aircraft.

g. On 11 April the pilot of an F9F-2P reported sighting a submarine submerging eight miles from the force. The AD-4W held the contact when 15 miles away from the area and vectored the AD-4NL to the area. Identification was established as a whale.

h. The tactics of the ASP and escort have remained the same; 20 miles modified box search around the force, with the exception of the predawn flight. An ECM search is conducted by the AD-4NL until dawn. The AD-4W flies a wing position, and both aircraft leave their radars off. It is believed that this type search is superior to standard search tactics, as this is the most likely time of finding a submarine.

## VII - MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL

### 1. F9F-2

a. During the present tour in the forward area the squadron was scheduled for 563 flyable missions, of these 545 were completed for a percentage of 96.8%. The total flyable missions assigned to the squadron during the two tours it has spent in the forward area were 829. Of these 794 were completed for a percentage of 95.7%.

b. In an effort to more efficiently refill low oxygen bottles, two oxygen trailers, (stock number R58-T-165) were obtained and utilized during the past tour. On one occasion seven bottles were replenished in ten minutes, while under the previous system the same operation would have taken approximately one hour.

c. An average of fourteen planes can be serviced prior to replacing the 200 cubic foot capacity bottles mounted in cascade on the oxygen trailer. This method of replenishing the low oxygen bottles has proven highly satisfactory in all respects, and for use on carriers not having the oxygen refill lines connected on the flight deck is considered to be extremely practical.

d. On two occasions the arresting gear tail hook points split and parted from the hoop upon engagement with the cross deck pendants. They had previously been replaced in accordance with F9F Aircraft Technical Bulletin number 19 (revised) and the mishaps occurred during the subsequent first and sixth landings of the aircraft involved.

e. Both approaches were well controlled as to height over the deck, airspeed, and line up with the center line. The cut speed was approximately 112 kts with the wire engagement at approximately 104 kts. In both cases the engagement with the Davis barriers and the jet barricade was successful and the aircraft sustained minor damage.

f. Compliance with ComAirPac Aircraft Technical Bulletin number 9 (revised) has been completed with negative results. In no case was the landing gear actuating cylinder found to be in a condition that would cause a malfunction. However, in complying with the bulletin, the down-lock indicator switch assembly and the plunger on the actuating cylinder had to be removed. In the reassembly of the unit, an excessive number of man-hours had to be devoted to the readjustment of the subject parts.

g. A letter recommending the discontinuance of this bulletin is being initiated by VF-112.

## 2. AD-4

a. preliminary report from FASRON ELEVEN on the R3350-26WA engines of the 531000 series which were changed by this squadron during the last in-port period (after discovery of silver metal particles and gear teeth in the magnetic sump and outlet strainers) attributes failure to the following factors:

(1) Sludge contained in the oil after the use of oil dilution was due to the stripping of silver plate from rear balance weight sleeve and scoring of the tailshaft, prop-and journal shaft, and plug assembly.

(2) This resulted in failure of all three impeller driven secondary outer pinions, the impeller inner shaft rear bushing, the impeller intermediate gear bushing, and the impeller drive secondary pinion carrier bushing.

b. Due to information gathered from past experience on R3350 engines, ComAirPac made the following operational recommendations:

(1) The changing of engine oil after the first flight following the use of oil dilution if oil dilution had not been used within the past 30 hours.

(2) Changing oil every 60 hours when oil dilution is being used consistently.

(3) Checkage of rear sump and main engine oil strainer each 15 hours for presence of silver particles, gear teeth, or excessive sludge until satisfied further trouble is not apparent.

c. Departing Yokosuka with four aircraft requiring engine run-ins, the maintenance department scheduled 10 hours of slow-time for each, which was completed by 21 March. No trouble was encountered, and the planes were placed on the regular flight schedule.

d. The reverse-current-relay on the normal generator of V-512 went bad. The plane flew the first week on alternate generator with no ensuing trouble until a replacement generator was available.

e. The second week found the PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) encountering rough seas, which had a direct effect on the AD situation. V507 tore out tie down lines and bounced off the flight deck into the port catwalk, suffering structural damage which will necessitate transfer to a shore facility for repairs. V505 rammed forward into the rudder of V516, but the only required repair was a rudder change on the latter. A 30 cal. bullet hole pierced the trailing edge of the main spar at the root of the starboard wing on V503 during a combat flight. After thorough inspection, it was determined that the damage was not major, and repairs were affected by the squadron. V508 received AA damage to the main torsion or strength support of the engine. The aircraft was placed in a down status until returning to port, at which time an inspection by the Douglas Representative will determine whether or not it must be off-loaded for repairs. V504 had engine failure en-route to the target and was subsequently ditched. The apparent loss of power is undetermined, the pilot being able to maintain only 23"/2700 RPM at full throttle. Immediately prior to the time the plane hit the water, the engine was observed to catch on fire. The next week, V514 suffered a hit in the engine sector while over the target resulting in the loss of oil. With failing engine, it was ditched shortly thereafter in Wonsan Harbor.

## 3. AD-4W

a. One AD-4W has been AOG since 15 February 1952 for landing gear struts. For complete details, see the Aviation's Supply section in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for this period.

b. The only difficulty encountered in engineering, was the inability to procure a landing gear actuating cylinder for the AD-4W. Also, they were three electronic parts that were unobtainable. They are:

- (1) Inertia test switch
- (2) Wing tank fuel quantity gauge
- (3) 303 Light bulbs

#### 4. FlU-4

a. During this period maintenance of aircraft presented no special problems provided spare parts were available. However many shortages in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA aircraft spare parts stock reduced aircraft availability and caused unnecessary delays in bringing AOG aircraft in an "up" status. The following are items that seem to be short in supply:

Nomenclature	Stock No.	Ordered	Rec'd	Delay
1. Pump oil scavenger	R85-PW-135810	3/10/52	3/11/52	1 Day
2. Fitting, right arm assy.	R82-EV-VS-12256R	3/28/52	4/6/52	9 Days
3. Wing Assy, port	R82-CV-VS-11903 R82-CV-VS-37013-1	3/28/52	4/10/52	13 Days
4. Hose, oil cooler	R33-4-343-380	4/12/52	4/14/52	2 Days
5. Wing assy, port	R82-CV-VS-37013-1	4/13/52	OBL.	INDEF.

b. It is recommended that ships supply officers review their spare part stocks and provide adequate spares parts for all type aircraft on board. This should be reviewed both before leaving the continental limits and during each availability period at Yokosuka, Japan.

#### 5. FlU-5N

a. An engine change on NP-18, BuNo. 124517, was necessary due to supercharger low-coupling being inoperative. This engine change was completed in twenty-three hours.

b. The maintenance on AN/APS-19 & 19A equipment has improved considerably since out last time on station as evidenced by four to six mile targets on the intercept function, great ranges on land and sea targets, and better over-all availability. This is due to the fact that the men are better checked out on the equipment and that the series "E" magnetrons have been received and installed. Previously we have been issued magnetrons of the "A" and "B" series, none of which were accepted by the Navy after 1945. All of the earlier series showed poor output. A great majority of the trouble in the gear at the present time is tube trouble. Catapult launches seem particularly hard on the gear. Instances have occurred where the gear worked perfectly prior to launching but failed entirely in the air. As many as three tubes have been found with open filaments under these circumstances. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the filaments were opened during the launch.

c. The rest of the electronics gear has functioned satisfactorily.

#### 6. Aircraft Availability (During the Period 3/17/52 to 4/18/52)

Squadron	Average A/C on Board	Average A/C Available	Percent
VF-112	17	13.6	80
VF-113	18	14	77.7
VF-114	16.7	13.4	80.2

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Average A/C on Board</u>	<u>Average A/C Available</u>	<u>Percent</u>
VA-115	12.3	9.7	78.9
VC-3	3	2.2	73.3
VC-11	3	1.7	56.7
VC-35	4	3.5	87.5
VC-61	3	2.6	86.7

PART VIII - FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

1. Numbers & Types of Sorties For The Period 20 March Thru 15 April 1952

	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>F4U(N)</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>AD(N)</u>	<u>AD(W)</u>	<u>Total</u>
ASP						52	52
CAP	210	10	8				228
Strike	25	576	5	251			857
RECCO	196				2		198
Heckler			21		21		42
Photo	28						58
Photo Escort	61						61
Gator					52		52
NGF		30	5				35
Special Missions		25	3		2	1	31
<u>Total</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>641</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>1614</u>

J. W. ONSTOTT

E. F. VERDERY  
By direction

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6 JUN 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN  
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Subj: Action Report, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN from 12 May 1952  
to 6 June 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4  
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b) this report is submitted for inclusion with the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

PART I - MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The mission of Carrier Air Group ELEVEN is derived from CTF-77 Secret Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd revision). It consists primarily of rail interdiction against the North Korean railroad network. It consists also of interdiction against the enemy's transportation, communications, industrial, and supply facilities. Night and early morning hecklers, armed reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, and naval gunfire spot missions were conducted in support of the overall interdiction program. Defense missions consisted of ASP and CAP

COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT			PILOTS		
		5/12	5/31	6/6	5/12	5/31	6/6
CVG-11 CDR J. W. ONSTOTT	None	-	-	-	5	5	5
VF-112 CDR J. V. ROWNEY	F9F-2	17	17	17	23	23	23
VC-61 (Det. "C") LCDR R. L. NALL	F9F-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4
VF-113 LCDR J. R. STRANE	F4U-4	17	16	14	25	24	23
VF-114 LCDR G. B. BJORNSON	F4U-4	16	16	16	26	26	26
VC-3 (Det. "C") LCDR A. G. RUSSELL	F4U-4N	2	3	3	5	5	5
VA-115 CDR C. H. CARR	AD-4 AD-4L	12 4	11 2	11 2	26	26	26
VC-11 (Det. "C") LCDR R. D. BOTTEN	AD-4W	3	3	3	5 (Crews) 4	5 4	5 4
VC-35 (Det. "C")	AD-4NL AD-2Q AD-4Q	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	6 (Crews) 6	6 6	6 6

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**PART II - CHRONOLOGY**

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with Carrier Air Group ELEVEN embarked remained at Yokosuka during the period 18 April through 28 April 1952 for upkeep and rest and recreation. The ship and air group conducted training and refresher exercises to the South of Honshu during the periods 29 April - 1 May and 7 - 8 May 1952. The remainder of the time up to 12 May was spent in Yokosuka as ready carrier. A total of 280 sorties consisting of group tactics were flown during these two periods.

12 May - Departed Yokosuka to join Task Force 77 off the East coast of Korea. No air operations conducted.

13 May - Enroute to Task Force 77. Conducted refresher group tactics during the afternoon. Total sorties flown was 66.

14 May - Joined Task Force 77. Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

15 May - Conducted air operations over Northeast Korea. Missions consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, NGF, 1 jet strike and 3 prop strikes. Total sorties 99, total ammunition expended 11,700 (20 MM)/ 7,600 (50 Cal.), total rockets fired 12, total bombs dropped 73.4 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 53 railcuts, 3 railroad cars damaged, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 2 highway bridges damaged, 3 trucks damaged, 3 buildings destroyed and 7 damaged, 2 fuel dumps damaged and 2 troops killed or wounded.

16 May - Air operations continued as before. Total sorties 99, total ammunition expended 10,800 (20 MM)/ 43,700 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 81.8 tons, total napalm dropped 2.3 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 51 railcuts, 8 railroad cars damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed, 5 railroad bypasses damaged, 15 trucks destroyed and 14 damaged, 19 buildings destroyed, 3 supply dumps damaged, 1 fuel dump damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed and 2 damaged, 4 small boats damaged, and 21 troops killed or wounded.

ENS G. C. MC ALLISTER, VA-115, lost control of his AD upon take off due to slip stream ahead. His left wing dropped as he left the deck and the plane fell off to the port side of the ship's bow and crashed in the water. ENS MC ALLISTER was rescued by helicopter uninjured.

17 May - Air operations as before except that the afternoon and evening flights were cancelled due to inclement weather. Total sorties 63, total ammunition expended 3,500 (20 MM)/ 24,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 43.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 11 railcuts, 17 trucks destroyed and 13 damaged, 12 buildings damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed, 1 supply dump damaged, 1 fuel dump destroyed, 2 gun positions destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 shore batteries damaged, 1 hangar, 1 round house, 12 small boats, 1 locomotive repair ship, 1 railroad tunnel, 1 construction machine, and 1 pier damaged.

18 May - Force replenished.

19 May - Air operations conducted between 0330 - 0800(I) then cancelled due to inclement weather. The force then headed north to launch a group strikes against enemy installations in Chongjin. This was also cancelled due to weather. Total sorties flown during the morning 25, total ammunition expended 1,700 (20 MM)/ 1,900 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 19.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.



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Damage to the enemy consisted of 16 railcuts, 1 railroad car damaged, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 4 trucks destroyed, and 9 buildings destroyed.

LTJG S. C. BALMFORTH, VA-115 ditched his AD-4L within the Task Force upon returning from a rail strike. Engine failure was caused by AA hit. He was rescued by helicopter uninjured.

20 May - No air operations conducted due to fog. Intended to carry out group strikes on Chongjin.

21 May - No air operations due to fog. Still standing by to conduct strike on Chongjin.

22 May - The Task Force proceeded south because of inclement weather and conducted a group strike on Wonsan during the afternoon. Total sorties 73, total ammunition expended 1,500 (20 MM)/ 1,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 54.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 1 railcut, 14 large buildings completely destroyed, 3 gun positions damaged, and 2 troops known to be killed or wounded.

23 May - Continued rail interdiction. Total sorties 110, total ammunition expended 10,800 (20 MM)/ 2,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 84.8 tons, total napalm dropped 2.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 61 railcuts, 5 railroad cars destroyed and 21 damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed and 4 damaged, 2 railroad bypasses damaged, 2 highway bridges destroyed and 2 damaged, 17 trucks destroyed and 10 damaged, 10 buildings destroyed and 12 damaged, 2 warehouses destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 gun positions destroyed and 2 damaged, 2 shore batteries damaged, 7 small boats damaged, 1 ammo dump, 2 tanks, 2 high tension towers, 3 troop shelters, and 1 jeep were damaged.

24 May - Force replenished.

25 May - Conducted two group strikes on Chongjin. Total sorties 128, total ammunition expended 4,600 (20 MM)/ 9,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 98.5 tons, total napalm dropped 4.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 11 buildings destroyed and 19 damaged, 3 railroad cars destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed, 2 gun positions damaged, 3 transformer stations destroyed and 1 damaged, dock area damaged and 1 oxygen plant destroyed.

26 May - Continued routine rail interdiction against the enemy in Northeast Korea. Total sorties 101, total ammunition expended 3,800 (20 MM)/ 44,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 62.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 54 railcuts, 8 railroad cars destroyed and 17 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 31 trucks destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 building destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, 11 fuel dumps destroyed, 2 gun positions damaged, 110 troops killed or wounded, 1 small boat destroyed and 6 damaged, and 1 locomotive repair shop damaged.

27 May - Air operations continued as before. Total sorties 96, total ammunition expended 11,400 (20 MM)/ 33,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 68 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 68 railcuts, 8 railroad cars destroyed and 10 damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 6 trucks destroyed and 4 damaged, 2 buildings destroyed, 1 warehouse damaged, 3 supply dumps damaged, 3 truck shelters destroyed, and 4 troops killed or wounded.

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28 May - Force replenished.

29 May - Rail interdiction in Northeastern Korea continued. There were limited air operations due to inclement weather. Total sorties 71, total ammunition expended 9,900 (20 MM)/ 36,300 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 48.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2.8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 52 railcuts, 4 railroad cars damaged, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 2 railroad bypasses destroyed, 15 trucks destroyed and 4 damaged, 1 building damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed and 5 damaged, 2 gun positions damaged and 3 small boats damaged.

ENS M. G. WICKER, VF-113 ditched his F4U between Wonsan Harbor and Hungnam, five miles off the coast when his aircraft was hit by AA, covering an oil line. He was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from the LST 799.

LTJG P. S. SWANSON, VA-115, ditched his AD in Wonsan Harbor when his aircraft was hit by AA causing engine failure. He was rescued uninjured by the minesweeper, USS SYMBOL (AMS-123).

30 May - The force replenished in the morning because of unfavorable flying weather. During the afternoon very limited air operations were conducted due to continued bad weather. Total sorties flown 31, total ammunition expended 3,300 (20 MM)/ 8,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 18 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 8 railcuts, 6 railroad cars destroyed and 12 damaged, 3 trucks destroyed, 3 shore batteries damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, and 3 small boats damaged.

31 May - Continued air operations as before. Total sorties 96, total ammunition expended 8,300 (20 MM)/ 12,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57.5 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 42 railcuts, 1 railroad car damaged, 2 railroad bypasses destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 4 trucks damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 warehouse damaged, 1 supply dump destroyed and 2 damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed and 1 damaged.

1 June - Rail interdiction continues, one strike was made on the town of Kojo where enemy troops were reported to be barracked. Total sorties 92, total ammunition expended 10,000 (20 MM)/ 23,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 47.8 tons, total napalm dropped 8.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 55 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed, 7 trucks damaged, 18 buildings destroyed, 3 warehouses damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed, 1 fuel dump destroyed, and 100 troops killed or wounded.

LTJG G. C. CHICK, VF-113, was forced to ditch his F4U in Wonsan Harbor when his aircraft lost all fuel pressure as a result of an AA hit. He was picked up by the minesweeper USS CURLEW (AMS-8) uninjured.

2 June - Air operations over Northeast Korea continued with 94 total sorties, total ammunition expended 6,100 (20 MM)/ 21,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 56 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 34 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 5 trucks damaged, 5 buildings destroyed, 2 supply dumps damaged, 1 gun position destroyed and 1 damaged, 34 troops killed or wounded, 1 radar station damaged and 14 small boats damaged.

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

ENS G. R. BROWN, VF-113, ran into a violent slip stream upon take off and his F4U dived into the water off the bow. The belly tank blew up on contact and the plane sank immediately. The pilot did not escape.

3 June - Force replenished.

4 June - Limited air operations conducted in the morning. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA was relieved on the line by the USS PRINCETON, and departed for Yokosuka for upkeep and recreation. Total sorties 36, total ammunition expended 5,100 (20 MM)/ 10,600 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 24.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 24 railcuts, 1 railroad car destroyed, 1 truck destroyed, 1 gun position damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, and 10 small boats damaged.

5 June - Enroute to Yokosuka. No air operations conducted.

6 June - Arrived at Yokosuka.

## PART III - ORDNANCE

1. Comments on Ordnance Equipment.F9F

a. During the ships last stay at Yokosuka, VF-112 made the change in the F9F-2 gun charging system that was recommended by Commander Fleet Air Japan, S/L FF7-6/713 ser 890 of 7 April 1952 and approved by ComAirPac. This change was to help eliminate some of the light struck primer troubles encountered by F9F-2 squadrons by holding the four way selector valve exhaust port open at all times when the selector switch was placed in the "Ready" position. At the same time sufficient personnel were received for temporary additional duty from ComFairJap to enable the squadron gunnery department to initiate a night check crew to insure perfect maintenance of the ordnance equipment. Only (25,000) rounds of 20 MM ammunition were fired during this operating period but 107 stoppages were encountered, with the charging system accounting for 96 of them. Chargers were observed to back up in the "Ready" position during test firing on deck, 2 charger lugs were broken off and four chargers were knocked off the gun after the safety wires were broken, causing one accidental firing on the hangar deck. Loss of main hydraulic pressure was reported many times when the switches were placed in the "Safe" position indicating the exhaust valves were sticking open. Although pilots were thoroughly briefed to allow sufficient time on both the "Safe" and "Ready" cycle before attempting to fire, there were many cases of light struck primers and rounds half way into the chamber. The change will be removed from most of the planes, but further comparison and testing will continue and the results reported.

b. Because most trouble is encountered in the charging system, VF-112 never changes a gun without removing and completely overhauling the charger. There were eight spare guns allowed, but no spare chargers. A quick gun and charger change in the short time between flights was impossible. The lack of spare chargers also seriously hampered the operation of the night check system. With the help of ComFairJap personnel, the squadron was able to obtain four spare chargers during the latter part of the operating period, and the maintenance problem was greatly simplified. It is urgently recommended that squadron allowance be changed to include one spare charger for each spare gun.

c. The substitution of braided driving springs for the non available charger springs proved successful. Hydrolube seems to cause the back up rings to swell, but soaking them in oil for 24 hours before use helps this condition.

d. No E-51 gun oil is available and the substitute turbine oil does not have proper preservation qualities. Evidence of rust formation shows in a very short period of operation at sea. The squadron is now trying preservation oil W14-O-2833-65 to attempt to gain some improvement.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

F4U-4

a. Ordnance equipment has performed satisfactorily during this period.

F4U-5N

a. The MK AN-M-26 flares did not perform satisfactory. Of the 88 flares dropped, only 48 functioned. They were dropped from altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 feet, at airspeeds of 120 to 200 knots. The average air temperature was plus 10° C. and M146 fuses were used. Compron Three (Unit "C") is submitting a RUDAOE by separate letter. It is recommended that these flares be replaced by the MK6.

AD

a. In general, all ordnance equipment performed satisfactorily. Pertaining to the 20MM guns, it was discovered that when the initial round was fired, an average of 1,512 rounds per stoppage was obtained. Consideration of the failure to fire initial round because of faulty ammunition, slow travel of breech forward because of substitute lubricants, or malfunction of the hydraulic charging system for the same reason changes the computation to an average of only 550 rounds per stoppage.

2. Ordnance Expenditures.

Ordnance	Month	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
2000 # GP	May	0	0	68	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	68	68
1000 # GP	May	0	94	267	361
	June	0	0	30	30
	Total	0	94	297	391
500 # GP	May	0	257	96	353
	June	0	59	72	131
	Total	0	316	168	484
250 # GP	May	248	958	1,218	2,424
	June	40	229	372	641
	Total	288	1,187	1,590	3,065
100 # GP	May	16	362	0	378
	June	0	36	50	86
	Total	16	398	50	464
260 # Frag	May	0	106	36	142
	June	0	72	16	88
	Total	0	178	52	230
Napalm	May	0	18	19	37
	June	0	16	6	22
	Total	0	34	25	59
Flares MK-6	May	0	36	32	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	36	32	68
Flares MK-8	May	0	0	32	32
	June	0	0	4	4
	Total	0	0	36	36

## SECURITY INFORMATION

## Ordinance Expenditures Cont'd.

Ordinance	Month	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
Flares AN-M-26	May	0	68	28	96
	June	0	20	8	28
	Total	0	88	36	124
20 MM	May	25,000	9,075	46,067	80,142
	June	5,500	3,740	12,425	21,665
	Total	30,500	12,815	58,492	101,807
50 Cal.	May	0	253,660	0	253,660
	June	0	62,554	0	62,554
	Total	0	316,214	0	316,214

## PART IV -- BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Battle Damage to Enemy.

	Destroyed			Damaged		
	May	June	Total	May	June	Total
Rail Cuts				417	113	530
Locomotive				1		1
Railroad Bridges	7	3	10	11	1	12
Railroad Bypasses	4		4	10	1	11
Railroad Cars	30	1	31	85		85
Highway Bridges	2		2	7	1	8
Trucks	108	1	109	64	12	76
Buildings	73	23	96	48		48
Warehouses	5		5	10	3	13
Fuel Dumps	12	1	13	31		31
Supply Dumps	1		1	10	4	14
Armo Dumps				1		1
Gun Emplacements	12	4	16	18	2	20
Shore Batteries				6		6
Tanks				2		2
Jeeps				1		1
Radar Station					1	1
Oxygen Plant	1		1			
Transformer Stations	3		3	1		1
Troop Shelters				3		3
Troops				139	134	273
Roundhouse				1		1
Locomotive Repair Shop				2		2
High Tension Towers				2		2
Hangar				1		1
Truck Shelters	3		3			
Construction Machine				1		1
Railroad Tunnel				1		1
Piers				2		2
Small Boats	1		1	35	24	59

2. Battle Damage to own Aircraft.

VF-112	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
	16 May	F9F-2	127201	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	16 May	F9F-2	127194	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well Fairing
	16 May	F9F-2	127179	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side of Fuselage
	22 May	F9F-2	127215	Small Arms Fire	Port Flap
	22 May	F9F-2	127204	Flack	Port Wing
	23 May	F9F-2	127215	Small Arms Fire	Nose Section
	23 May	F9F-2	127207	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Droop Snoot & Dive Brake
	23 May	F9F-2	127163	Flack	Port Horizontal Stabilizer & Elevator

SECURITY INFORMATION

Battle Damage to own Aircraft Cont'd.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VF-112	26 May	F9F-2	127205	Flack	Port Tip Tank
(Cont'd)	26 May	F9F-2	127190	Small Arms Fire	Tail Pipe
	31 May	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Nose Section
	1 June	F9F-2	127202	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Stabilizer
	4 June	F9F-2	127205	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
VF-113	15 May	F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	16 May	F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage, Canopy & Stbd Wing
	16 May	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	17 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	17 May	F4U-4	81152	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing & Horizontal Stabilizer
	17 May	F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Port Flap
	17 May	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Engine Cowling
	23 May	F4U-4	81317	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Horizontal Stabilizer & Elevator
	23 May	F4U-4	81251	Bomb Blast	Stbd Wheel Well
	23 May	F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	23 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	23 May	F4U-4	80837	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	25 May	F4U-4	82163	Flack	Stbd Wing
	26 May	F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	27 May	F4U-4	81176	Flack	Port Wing
	27 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	29 May	F4U-4	81037	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	29 May	F4U-4	80801	20MM Fire	Accessory Cowling, engine Mount, Fuselage & Port Wing Stub
	29 May	F4U-4	97179	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
	30 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Both Wings & Fuselage
	1 June	F4U-4	80801	Small Arms Fire	Accessory Cowling & Oil Tank
	1 June	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
	1 June	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Flap & Vertical Stabilizer
	1 June	F4U-4	82163	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
VF-114	16 May	F4U-4	97046	Flack	Port Side of Fuselage
	16 May	F4U-4	81188	Flack	Stbd Aileron
	19 May	F4U-4	97046	Small Arms Fire	Port Oil Cooler
	23 May	F4U-4	81219	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub
	26 May	F4U-4	80848	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
	31 May	F4U-4	81839	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	31 May	F4U-4	97046	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
VA-115	16 May	AD-4	123995	Bomb Blast	Stbd Wing Stub
	16 May	AD-4	123999	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	16 May	AD-4	123951	Flack	Stbd Wing & Aileron
	16 May	AD-4	123865	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	16 May	AD-4	128922	Flack	Stbd Wing
	16 May	AD-4	123843	Small Arms Fire	Horizontal & Vertical Stabilizer
	16 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	16 May	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	19 May	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Oil Cooler (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	19 May	AD-4	127875	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub, Engine Cowling & Port Wheel Well



## SECURITY INFORMATION

## Battle Damage to own Aircraft Cont'd.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VA-115 (Cont'd)	19 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Propeller, Engine Cowling, horizontal & Vertical Stabilizer
	22 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well Door
	23 May	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Both Wings & Port Wing Stub
	23 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	23 May	AD-4	127874	Flack	Fuselage
	26 May	AD-4	123843	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	26 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Rudder & Vertical Stabilizer
	26 May	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Empennage & Fuselage
	26 May	AD-4	123937	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	27 May	AD-4	127875	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Tip
	27 May	AD-4	123937	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	27 May	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Tip & Port Wing Stub
	27 May	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	27 May	AD-4	123951	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub
	29 May	AD-4	123951	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	30 May	AD-4	123865	Flack	Stbd Wing Stub & Flap
	2 June	AD-4	123966	Flack	Stbd Wing
	2 June	AD-4	123929	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	2 June	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron & Oil Cooler
	4 June	AD-4	123966	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
VC-3	19 May	F4U-4N	124519	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
VC-35	29 May	AD-4NL	124748	20MM Fire	Port Wing & Fuselage
	30 May	AD-2Q	122379	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron & Wing

3. Loss of own aircraft due to operational causes.

Date	Squadron	Type	BuNo	Cause
16 May 1952	VA-115	AD-4	123996	Dived in Water on take off. Cause: slip stream.
2 June 1952	VF-113	F4U-4	81152	Dived in Water on take off. Cause: slip stream.

## PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel Performance:

- a. VF-113 - Satisfactory.
- b. VF-114 - Satisfactory.
- c. VA-115 - Satisfactory.
- d. VC-3, VC-11, VC-35, and VC-61, (Detachments "C") - Satisfactory.

e. VF-112 - Morale remained very high and the performance of the men was excellent in spite of the heavy work load imposed by the loss of many of the senior rated men. It has become necessary for this command to acquire sixteen additional men on temporary duty to fill key vacancies. Nine men were received from FASRON 11, four from FASRON 120, and three from ships company. The majority of these men had no previous training for the sort of work they are required to do in this unit, and present a severe training problem.

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It is recommended that orders issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel be routed via the administrative command for information. Bureau of Naval Personnel orders to shore duty have accounted for the majority of personnel losses, and in no case does COMAIRPAC receive any advance notice of such a transfer in order to effect a replacement. Each transfer to shore duty is a man with two years or more of continuous sea duty and, in most cases, one of the more senior rated men of the unit. Provision is made for the command to retain these men at its discretion, but in the light of the morale problem involved, such a practice is not desirable. It is believed that the practice of this command to transfer all men who so desire, in the event they receive shore duty orders, has contributed materially to the high morale and working efficiency of the unit. However, not one replacement has been received to date.

It is further recommended that any relief ordered to the unit be transferred at least 60 days prior to the intended date of relieving, in order to arrive prior to the departure date of the man relieved. This would be particularly true in the case of the higher pay grades. Every effort should be made to provide a relief of the same job code designation in the case of aviation mechanics of pay grades E-6 and E-7, due to the wide difference in training for jet and reciprocating engineering maintenance.

## 2. Casualties

a. ENS Gerald R. BROWN, 505733/1310, USN, VF-113 killed as a result of a crash when his plane encountered slip stream upon takeoff on a combat mission and dived in the sea. The plane sank immediately. Body was not recovered. Position of the ship was Lat. 39-01N, Longitude 129-19 E.

## PART VI - OPERATIONS

1. F9F During this tour on the line, several variations of tactics and procedures have been used by VF-112 and have proved to be satisfactory. They are as follows:

a. It has been found that no advantage is obtained by climbing to any altitude in excess of 10,000 feet on a strike or a photo hop. Time and fuel savings are negligible with increase in altitudes, especially when external stores are carried.

b. When anti-aircraft defenses are known to be slight and when terrain permits it has been found that excellent results with rail bombing can be obtained by using high speed (300 Kts or more) "Low Level" bombing runs. By "Low Level" its meant using a minimum of 2 feet of altitude for each pound of bomb, i.e. 250# use 500 feet etc., compensating for deflection error by taking into account the bomb stations and their distance outboard on the wing. Sighting is automatically done by flying along the track, using the nose as a reference. Results have been very satisfactory using this method.

c. VF-112 recommends using section tactics in preference to whole divisions when conducting "Armed Recco" assignments. Sections have many advantages over entire divisions in recco assignments. They are more versatile, and are able to cover the same assignment more effectively. By dividing the route into two parts and giving each section half, the effectiveness of the division is doubled. Radio contact can be maintained and rendezvous can be effected by proper pre-flight briefing.

d. The F9F is an extremely effective flak-suppression weapon. The four 20MM cannon make the F9F valuable for any coordinated strike. The F9F

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should be made available for a flak-suppression run after the bombing run of the propellers. It is possible for the jet to make it's bombing run before the prop planes, pull up and come around for strafing on flak positions while the AD's and F4U's are initiating a recovery. Proper pre-flight briefing is mandatory when using jets and prop planes in this type of attack.

e. The optimum ordnance loading for the F9F is four 250# bombs. This is true because:

- (1) Outboard racks can be removed and speed can be gained.
- (2) It is felt that the 250# bomb is about the smallest bomb that is effective on our present targets.
- (3) The aircraft is not seriously handicapped in range or endurance by using this load during an hour and a half flight.

f. It is recommended that the portable radio (AN-CRC-7) be carried in the PK2 liferaft by all jets in the operating area. The radio would replace the radar reflector now carried in the raft. This radio would provide a downed pilot with an additional survival aid, and would also serve as a means to locate the man by other planes in the area. Due to the F9F's extreme range, high speed, and the short time available to effect any rescue or to remain on station as a rescue CAP, the radio would save valuable time in effecting the rescue and provide a positive means to keep in contact with the downed pilot in the event that the accompanying plane had to leave before the rescue was accomplished or before a permanent rescap arrived.

2. AD Air operations during this period have continued the same as previous periods. There were three group strikes conducted against enemy installations and facilities at Chong-jin and Wonsan. During this period, one returning strike was subject to a controlled approach and let down to a carrier landing due to low ceilings and fog. This operation was considered unsatisfactory due to the lack of practice and experience of both the pilots and the ships controllers. It definitely brought out the fact that Carriers and Air Groups should practice this procedure before arriving at WesPac. This type exercise should be scheduled whenever carriers in WesPac have the opportunity to conduct refresher training. The CCA procedure set forth in CTF 77 ltr ser 080 dated 17 May 1951 is considered to be an excellent plan with one exception. Rather than bring sections down at one minute intervals, the aircraft should be fed into the pattern at same rate planes land aboard with no more than four planes in the traffic pattern at one time. This would limit the number of aircraft to be controlled in a restricted area should the landing pattern change from contact to instrument conditions, thus limiting the chances of collision.

### 3. Survival

It has become increasingly apparent that a set of joint service rescue signals for combat areas should be drawn up and promulgated to all concerned. The signals used by the Navy, Marines and Air Corps vary, and even the different Air Groups within TF 77 do not use the same signals. Unless all services employ the same signal code, the pilot on the ground awaiting rescue may not understand or may misinterpret the signals given by aircraft flying the ResCap, particularly if the aircraft are from another service branch. The signal code now in effect set forth in the Pilot Information File, NavAer 00-80-T-33 is adequate for forced landings not in enemy territory. However, there should be a modified set of signal for the rescue of pilots and crew members forced down in enemy territory. Signals for the following conditions should be added:

- a. Down pilot, pinned down by enemy fire, indicates that fact to the Res-

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Cap so they can seek out the enemy and strafe them.

b. ResCap informs down pilot that he is sighted, and that the helicopter is on the way.

c. ResCap wants the down pilot to walk in a certain direction i.e., away from enemy troops or to a clear area where the helicopter can land.

d. ResCap wishes to inform pilot that rescue cannot be effected today due to weather, or coming darkness, or no helicopter available at that time, but will be attempted the next day.

e. ResCap wishes to inform pilot that for some reason rescue can't be effected and that the pilot is on his own to escape and evade.

f. Pilot wishes to inform ResCap that it is necessary for him to walk in a certain direction to avoid capture, or that he is taking off in that direction because rescue can't be effected in the present location.

This command has noted the advent of the (AN-CRC-7) radio in the operating area as of May 1952. It is further noted that this radio was made available to the military in 1945. It seems unfortunate that a period of nearly two years has elapsed from the commencement of hostilities in the Korean theater and the arrival of this vital equipment. In a one week period, pilots of this Air Group have listened to the proceedings attendant to three rescue efforts. It was evident that, in each case, the ground-air radio played a major part in the rescue.

PART VII - MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL

F2F

1. During the present tour in the forward area VF-112 was scheduled for 110 flyable missions, and of these, 100 were completed for a percentage of 97.5%. The total flyable missions assigned to the squadron during the three tours in the forward area was 1179 of which 1140 were completed for a percentage of 96.7%.

2. The efforts of the maintenance department of VF-112 have been seriously hampered due to apparent lack of high usage items in the normal supply channels. Although all AOG parts have been obtained from various ships and sources, the hours lost in awaiting the arrival of parts and the time they are generally received has caused a serious deficiency in the distribution of continually increasing work load. The inability of the ship to obtain parts which they have requested as priority "A", even though the same part is available when ordered under an "AOG" category, is felt to be a contributing factor to this situation. A survey of maintenance records shows that 318 aircraft hours have been lost due to this deficiency during this tour.

3. Prior to the close of the last tour in the forward area, fuel was taken aboard which had a high water content, and immediately serious trouble was experienced with the pressurizing valve freezing in the closed position. Prior to this time the squadron had not found it necessary to use oil dilution in fuel supply, but with the presence of water, oil had to be added to the fuel. This partially eliminated the difficulty. During the last period in Yokosuka, proportioners were received and installed, and the amount of oil utilized was gradually increased to over 2%. This tour a supply of water-contaminated fuel was received, and the use of oil in the fuel system had little or no effect in preventing freezing of the pressurizing valves. If efficient operation and maintenance is to be continued, positive measures will have to be taken to ensure that uncontaminated fuel is delivered to the operating units.

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

4. The following shortages for immediate issue by aviation supply of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) resulted in the serious hampering of maintenance for F9F aircraft:

- a. Grease - General Purpose: R14-G-860  
Approximately 8 to 10 hours delay 25 May 1952 while procured from another ship on a priority "A" requisition.
- b. Transmitter - Oil Pressure: R88-I-2651-200-000  
One order priority "AOG" 26 May 1952 for F9F BuNo. 126207. The part was not received until the morning of 31 May 1952. The aircraft was grounded during that time.
- c. Liner - Combustion Chamber: R85-PW-169553  
Between 18 May 1952 and 31 May 1952, a total of 8 F9F aircraft were grounded approximately 6 to 8 hours each while liners of this type were procured from other ships on priority "AOG" requisition.
- d. Duct - Weldment, Turbine Exhaust: R85-PW-153026  
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay 24 May 1952 while procurement of one from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition. As a necessity, another duct was taken off the Quick Engine Change unit and used on a grounded plane in order to meet the flight schedule. A replacement was ordered for the Quick Engine Change unit on a priority "A" requisition 29 May 1952. As of 31 May 1952 it has not been received.
- e. Valve Assembly - Fuel Pressurization and shut-off: R85-BPD-116417-5  
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay 31 May 1952 while procurement of two from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition.
- f. Fairing Assembly - Main Landing Gear Right: R82-GR-132255R  
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay, 31 May, while procurement of one from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition.
- g. It is believed that other shortages on such items as R86-VI-AA-20334L Hydraulic Pump Assemblies and R82-GR-132255L Main Wheel Fairing Assemblies, Left, exist in ship's supply. However no "AOG" requisitions have resulted from the shortage.

5. Some of the above shortages exist due high usage, others are due to unavailability of parts in the supply system. It is believed that appropriate action has not been taken in supply channels upon the various follow-up dispatches sent out by the supply department of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). Therefore, problems encountered in maintenance are increasing, and the results are being reflected in the availability of aircraft for combat missions.

AD

1. One aircraft remained "AOG" for practically the whole period of this report. The yoke on the horizontal stabilizer was damaged by a .30 Cal. bullet and no replacement part was available on the ship. Other than this one aircraft, maintenance was satisfactory.

The F4U, F4U(N), AD(N) and AD(W)'s had no unusual maintenance problems during the period of this report.

Electronics

1. The APS-19A equipment installed in the F4U-5N's has performed in an outstanding manner during this period. This can be attributed to the results of the extensive training program established within the unit. As an example, shore line targets are regularly presented at ranges of about 100 miles at

SECURITY INFORMATION

3000' altitude, and the task group has been intercepted on occasions at ranges of 80 miles. The few airborne failures experienced were caused by catapult launches. Other airborne electronics equipment functioned satisfactory.

Aircraft Availability (12 May - 5 June 1952)

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Average A/C on Board</u>	<u>Average A/C Available</u>	<u>Percent</u>
VF-112	17	14.3	84.1
VF-113	16.4	15.1	92.1
VF-114	16	14.7	91.9
VA-115	14.1	11.9	84.4
VC-3	3	2.7	90.0
VC-11	3	2.8	93.3
VC-35	5	4.1	82.0
VC-61	3	2.6	86.6

1. This availability was computed at 0800 daily during the period 12 May through 5 June 1952.

2. The Air Group was able to meet its assigned missions by 97.99% during this period.

PART VIII - FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

1. Numbers and Types of Sorties (12 May - 6 June 1952).

	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>F4U(N)</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>AD(N)</u>	<u>AD(W)</u>	<u>Total</u>
ASP						39	39
CAP	235	4					239
Strike	15	391		211			617
Rocco	84						84
Heckler			26		22		48
Photo	39						39
Photo Escort	37						37
Gator		3		8	25		36
NGF		28					28
TarCap		4					4
ECM					4		4
Special					5		5

J. W. ONSTOTT



## SECURITY INFORMATION

FLU-4

a. Ordnance equipment has performed satisfactorily during this period.

FLU-5N

a. The MK AN-M-26 flares did not perform satisfactory. Of the 88 flares dropped, only 48 functioned. They were dropped from altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 feet, at airspeeds of 120 to 200 knots. The average air temperature was plus 10° C, and M146 fuses were used. Compron Three (Unit "C") is submitting a RUDAOE by separate letter. It is recommended that these flares be replaced by the MK6.

AD

a. In general, all ordnance equipment performed satisfactorily. Pertaining to the 20MM guns, it was discovered that when the initial round was fired, an average of 1,512 rounds per stoppage was obtained. Consideration of the failure to fire initial round because of faulty ammunition, slow travel of breech forward because of substitute lubricants, or malfunction of the hydraulic charging system for the same reason changes the computation to an average of only 550 rounds per stoppage.

2. Ordnance Expenditures.

Ordnance	Month	F9F	FLU	AD	Total
2000 # GP	May	0	0	68	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	68	68
1000 # GP	May	0	94	267	361
	June	0	0	30	30
	Total	0	94	297	391
500 # GP	May	0	257	96	353
	June	0	59	72	131
	Total	0	316	168	484
250 # GP	May	248	958	1,218	2,424
	June	40	229	372	641
	Total	288	1,187	1,590	3,065
100 # GP	May	16	362	0	378
	June	0	36	50	86
	Total	16	398	50	464
260 # Frag	May	0	106	36	142
	June	0	72	16	88
	Total	0	178	52	230
Napalm	May	0	18	19	37
	June	0	16	6	22
	Total	0	34	25	59
Flares MK-6	May	0	36	32	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	36	32	68
Flares MK-8	May	0	0	32	32
	June	0	0	4	4
	Total	0	0	36	36

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIR FORCE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

CVG-11/A16-13  
(EFV:jgo)  
Ser: 031  
8 July 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN  
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Subj: Action Report, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN from 21 June 1952  
to 8 July 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4  
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) this report is submitted for inclusion with the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

PART I - MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The mission of Carrier Air Group ELEVEN is derived from CTF-77 Secret Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd Revision). This period was devoted primarily to group strikes against the enemy's hydro-electric power complexes and industrial installations throughout North Korea. It also consisted of a limited amount of rail interdiction and large strikes on troop and supply concentrations and truck shelters. Night and early morning hecklers, armed reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, and naval gunfire spot missions were conducted in support of the overall program. Defense missions consisted of ASP and CAP.

COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT			PILOTS		
		6/21	6/30	7/5	6/21	6/30	7/5
CVG-11 CDR J. W. ONSTOTT	None	-	-	-	5	5	5
VF-112 CDR J. V. ROWNY	F9F-2	17	17	17	23	23	23
VC-61 (Det. "C") LCDR R. L. HALL	F2H-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4
VF-113 LCDR J. R. STRANE	F4U-4	16	16	15	23	23	22
VF-114 LCDR G. B. BJORNSEN	F4U-4	16	15	15	26	26	26
VC-3 (Det. "C") LCDR A. G. RUSSELL	F4U-5N	3	3	3	5	5	5
VA-115 CDR C. H. CARR	AD-4 AD-4L	12 4	12 3	11 3	25	25	25
VC-11 (Det. "C") LCDR R. D. BOTTEN	AD-4W	3	3	3	5 4	5 4	5 4 (Crews,
VC-35 (Det. "C") LT F. D. HOOKS	AD-4NL AD-2Q AD-4Q	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	6 5	6 5	6 5 (Crews,

Notes: The final combat sorties were flown on 5 July. The figures in the third column under the heading Operational Aircraft indicate the number of aircraft at the end of combat air operations that date. On the same day, 3 AD's, 6 F4U-4's and 2 F4U-5N's were transferred to the USS BOXER and USS BON HOMME RICHARD. These transfers are not indicated in the figures above.

SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with Carrier Air Group ELEVEN embarked remained at Yokosuka during the period 6 June through 13 June 1952 for up-keep, rest and recreation. During the period 14 June through 20 June 1952, the USS PHILIPPINE SEA was ready carrier and remained at Yokosuka except for three days training exercises which were conducted to the south of Honshu on 16-18 June 1952. A total of 114 sorties consisting of group tactics in a simulated strike on Johnson Air Force Base, and refresher training in carrier control approach procedures. One aircraft was lost during this period when LT I. POLKOWSKI, VF-114 was forced to ditch his corsair because of engine failure. LT POLKOWSKI was rescued by the ship's helicopter, uninjured.

21 June - The USS PHILIPPINE SEA departed Yokosuka in company with the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) to join Task Force 77 off the east coast of Korea. No air operations were conducted by this air group.

22 June - Enroute to Task Force 77. No air operations were conducted.

23 June - The ship joined Task Force 77 this date and conducted coordinated group strikes along with Air Groups 2, 7, 19, and the 5th Air Force. This marked the first time since the Korean war started that the enemy's hydro-electric power plants were heavily attacked. This was the first time since the Fall of 1950 that four carriers (CV) have operated together on the line in the Korean War. Mixed strike groups consisting of aircraft of the four air groups attacked nine different hydro-electric power plants situated throughout North Korea including the fourth largest one in the world located at Suiho on the Yalu River. Total sorties for this group 67, total ammunition expended 9,000 (20 MM)/ 12,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 47.5 tons.

One AD, pilot LTJG M. K. LAKE, VA-115 landed wheels up at K-14 after his aircraft was hit over the Yalu River by Anti-Aircraft fire in the wheel well. The pilot was uninjured.

24 June - Two air group strikes were conducted. One group attacked the hydro-electric power plant designated Kyosen #3, and the other on the Kojo Power Complex at CT 978948, CT 988965 and DT 020987. Troop, vehicle and supply concentrations at Ambyon were attacked. Total sorties for the day 129, total ammunition expended 7,000 (20 MM)/ 8,900 (50 Cal.), total rockets expended 24, total bombs dropped 94.5 tons and 8 tons of incendiaries.

25 June - Two group strikes were conducted this date. One group attacked a camouflaged vehicle parking area at CT 748896. When the assigned targets were found to be obscured by overcast, the other group attacked large troop concentrations at CU 558056 to CU 564045, CU 574058, and CU 564041 to CU 559023. Total sorties for the day 67, total ammunition expended 7,000 (20 MM)/ 3,400 (50 Cal.), total rockets expended 23, total bombs dropped 50.3 tons and 3.5 tons of incendiaries.

26 June - Force replenished. No air operations conducted.

27 June - Continued to conduct coordinated group strikes composed of F9F-2, AD and F4U-4 aircraft. Attacks again were directed against troop and supply concentrations rather than railroads. The morning strike attacked a large troop concentration at CU 558056 to CU 564045, CU 574058, CU 564041 to CU 559023. Other attacks were made on a large troop billeting area and supply storage at CU 573043 to CU 579036, and CU 581045. The afternoon strike was directed against troops, supplies and truck parking areas at CU 620070 to CU 598077, truck parking and repair shops CU 630055 to CU 605051, and a troop concentration at CU 620007 to CU 602000. Total sorties flown 119, total ammunition expended 10,500 (20 MM)/ 21,100 (50 Cal.), total rockets expended 16, total bombs dropped 57.8 tons, and 5.2 tons of incendiaries.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

28 June - Air operations consisted of rail interdiction missions this date. However, due to increasingly inclement weather over target areas during the day, the afternoon strikes were cancelled. Total sorties 72, total ammunition expended 9,800 (20 MM)/ 9,700 (50 Cal.), total rockets expended 30, total bombs dropped 44.8 tons, and 3 tons of napalm.

29 June - The Task Force steamed north during the night in order to conduct group strikes on the Puryong hydro-electric power complex. However, a heavy fog bank covered the operating area, and all air operations were cancelled.

30 June - No air operations due to inclement weather.

1 July - Task Force replenished, no air operations conducted.

2 July - Attacks were conducted against large enemy troop concentrations and supplies throughout the valleys of the CU sector. Rail interdiction missions were conducted in the Ginny, Gladys and Gwen sectors. Total sorties flown 83, total ammunition expended 11,400 (20 MM)/ 10,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 36 tons and 2.5 tons of napalm.

3 July - Air operations were limited because of inclement weather. A group strike was conducted against the Puryong power complex in northeastern Korea. Air Groups from the BOXER and BON HOMME RICHARD also were scheduled to attack targets in this complex. Each group was assigned a separate hydro-power plant. However, the target areas were covered by broken clouds and heavy overcast. This air group flying through adverse weather finally was able to attack their assigned target, and one of the other power plants, seriously damaging Puryong #1 and Puryong #2. This group also attacked a nearby large factory and inflicted heavy damage on the large buildings and warehouses. Total sorties flown 53, total ammunition expended 3,000 (20 MM)/ 3,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 52.3 tons.

4 July - Rail strikes were conducted in the Cathy, Cherry, Bonnie, Birdie, Clair, Cindy, Dottie, Dagmar, Fern and Eve sectors. Total sorties 94, total ammunition expended 3,600 (20 MM)/ 6,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 58.5 tons, 2.5 tons of napalm and 1.2 tons of incendiaries.

LTJG G. C. CHICK, USNR, VF-113, presumably hit by small arms fire while making a strafing run in the vicinity of Lat 38-56 N, Long 127°-42' E, crashed into the ground in his Corsair and was killed.

CDR C. H. CARR, USN, VA-115 was forced to ditch his AD in the vicinity of Lat 40°-00'N, Long 128°-32'E, when his starboard wing caught on fire during a strafing run on the target. Fire was presumably started by an AA hit in the ammunition containers. CDR CARR was rescued by the USS COUNNER (DE-700). He received a compound fracture of lower right arm and lacerations about the head and legs.

5 July - Attacks were conducted on rail sectors Dottie, Bonnie, Edith, Eileen, Fern and Flo. A troop billeting area, CU 675288 to CU 684286, and truck repair and storage areas, CU 374345 to CU 376339 was attacked. Total sorties flown 94, total ammunition expended 6,000 (20 MM)/ 28,700 (50 Cal.), total rockets fired 25, total bombs dropped 51 tons, and dropped 1.5 tons of napalm and 1.9 tons of incendiaries.

LMS J. R. MULLEN, USNR, VF-114 was forced to land his F4U-4 eight miles from the task force in the water at Lat 39°-15'N, Long 130°-00'E because of engine failure. He was rescued by the ship's helicopter uninjured.

6 July - The Force replenished in the morning. Thirteen F9F-2 aircraft were flown to ILS Atsugi in the afternoon for transfer to FASRON 11. Two AD-4's were transferred to the PRINCETON and 2 AD-3's were received in exchange. Two F9F-2 aircraft were transferred to the BOXER. Carrier Landing Qualifications were conducted for three Marine pilots flying F2H-2P aircraft. The group launched 29 aircraft to clear the flight deck for the Carrier Landing Qualifications.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July -- Enroute to Yokosuka. Twentythree F4U, 6 AD-4 and 3 AD-4N aircraft launched, to be ferried to IJMS Atsugi for transfer to FASHON 11A

8 July -- Arrived at Yokosuka.

## PART III -- ORDNANCE

1. Ordnance Equipment -- No Comments.

2. Ordnance Expenditures.

a. Ordnance for June.

Ordnance	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
2000 # GP	0	0	57	57
1000 # GP	0	44	139	183
500 # GP	0	130	76	206
250 # GP	87	186	124	397
100 # GP	72	0	0	72
260 # Frag	0	372	482	854
Incendiaries (100 #)	0	104	230	334
Napalm	0	7	4	11
Flares MK5	0	0	0	0
Flares MK6	0	14	0	14
Flares MK8	0	0	10	10
Flares AN-M-26	0	8	8	16
20 MM	13,848	6,765	13,685	34,298
50 Cal.	0	66,855	0	66,855
Atars (Rockets)	0	58	18	76
Shrp (Rockets)	0	0	0	0
AN-MK-1 (Depth Bomb)	0	0	1	1

b. Ordnance for July.

Ordnance	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
2000 # GP	0	0	11	11
1000 # GP	0	38	65	103
500 # GP	0	70	74	144
250 # GP	44	138	194	376
100 # GP	104	252	0	356
260 # Frag	0	106	68	174
Incendiaries (10 #)	0	0	126	126
Napalm	0	5	4	9
Flares MK5	0	20	0	20
Flares MK6	0	0	0	0
Flares MK8	0	0	20	20
Flares AN-M-26	0	0	8	8
20 MM	11,675	1,440	9,000	22,115
50 Cal.	0	53,257	0	53,257
Atars (Rockets)	0	24	0	24
Shrp (Rockets)	0	0	7	7
AN-MK-1 (Depth Bomb)	0	0	0	0

## PART IV -- BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Battle Damage to Enemy -- There has been a deviation from the rail interdiction program during this period. Joint air group strikes were conducted by CTF-77 carriers on hydro-electric power complexes, industrial installations, troop concentrations and supply areas. All targets were destroyed or heavily damaged. Many of the lucrative targets were located in areas that previously had received little attention by allied aircraft along the Manchurian border.

# SECURITY INFORMATION

## 2. Battle Damage to own Aircraft.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VF-112	6-25	F9F-2	127197	Small Arms Fire	Port Side Fuselage
	6-28	F9F-2	127204	Flack	Hydraulic system - Plane landed aboard with only one wheel down.
	7-4	F9F-2	127186	Flack	Stbd side of fuselage
VF-113	6-23	F4U-4	82170	Flack	Accessory Section
	7-4	F4U-4	81835	Unknown	Unknown, plane crashed - Presumably hit by small arms fire.
	7-4	F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Horizontal Stabilizer
VF-114	6-28	F4U-4	97046	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	7-4	F4U-4	80910	Flack	Stbd Wing
VA-115	6-1	AD-4	123843	Bomb Blast	Eng Cowling & Sump
	6-23	AD-4L	123966	Small Arms Fire	Survival bomb
	6-23	AD-4L	123976	Flack	Hyd system, Plane landed ashore wheels up. Declared D-2 damage.
	6-24	AD-4L	123992	Small Arms Fire	Horizontal stabilizer
	6-28	AD-4	123929	Small Arms Fire	Horizontal stabilizer
	6-28	AD-4	127874	Flack	Air scoop
	7-4	AD-4	127876	Unknown	Presumably hit by flack in stbd ammo box; plane caught fire & was ditched
	7-4	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	7-3	F4U-5N	121915	Bomb blast & Small Arms Fire	Engine Cowling, port & Stbd wing, empnage

## 3. Loss of own Aircraft due to operational cause.

Date	Squadron	Type	BuNo	Cause
5 July 1952	VF-114	F4U-4	80877	Ditched at sea due to engine failure.

## PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

### 1. Personnel Performance - Satisfactory.

### 2. Casualties.

a. LTJG Grover C. CHICK, 0411501/1310, USNR, VF-113 was killed in action when, presumably, he was struck by enemy ground fire during a strafing run. His corsair crashed and exploded in enemy territory at Lat 38-56 N, Lon 127-43 E.

b. CDR Charles H. CARR, 100106/1310, USN, VA-115, was injured when his AD caught fire during a strafing run and he was forced to ditch at Lat 40°-00'N, Long 128°-22'E. He was rescued by the USS COURIER (DE-700). He received a compound fracture of the lower right arm and lacerations about the head and legs.

## PART VI - OPERATIONS

1. It is note worthy to mention that VF-112 completed the entire combat tour, 25 January - 5 July 1952, without loss or major damage to a single aircraft. The squadron accomplished 1711 carrier landings and 816 combat sorties with minor damage to only one aircraft which made a one wheel landing after the plane was hit by enemy AA fire.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

2. On 3 July coordinated night attacks by the night hecklers under the direction of a destroyer off shore in the Songjin area resulted in the extensive damaging of two trains with locomotives and a third locomotive. Extremely bad weather prevented further damage to three other locomotives sighted in Songjin. The destroyer sighted the trains and directed the aircraft on the targets, furnishing target illumination by star shells which resulted in the successful attacks by the heckler aircraft. This type of coordinated effort is extremely beneficial to the night heckler program in the destroying enemy's railroad facilities. It is recommended that all units concerned, being deployed to WesPac, be prepared to conduct this type of operation.

## PART VII - MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL

1. No Comments.

2. Aircraft availability (21 June - 5 July)

Squadron	Average A/C on Board	Average A/C Available	Percent
VF-112	17	15.5	91.2
VF-113	16	14.2	88.8
VF-114	15	13.5	90.0
VA-115	15.2	14.0	92.1
VC-3	3	2.9	96.6
VC-11	3	2.7	90.0
VC-35	5	4.3	86.0
VC-61	3	2.6	86.7

Note: This availability was computed at 0800 daily during the above period.

## PART VIII - FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

1. Number and Types of Sorties, 21 June - 5 July 1952.

	F2H(P)	F9F	F4U	F4U(N)	AD	AD(N)	AD(W) 21	Total
ASP							21	21
CAP		80	8					88
Strike		97	283		152			432
Recco		32						32
Heckler				28		10		38
Photo	20							20
Photo Escort		12						12
Gator					1	20		21
TarCap			4					4
NGF			8					8
Special			10					10

J. W. ONSTOTT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN  
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Subj: Action Report Carrier Air Group ELEVEN for the period 12 July 1952  
through 24 July 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 of 1 July 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a), this report is submitted for inclusion in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

2. Carrier Air Group ELEVEN was embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) during this period. Since most of CVG-11 aircraft were transferred to the PHILIPPINE SEA aircraft pool with the exception of five F2H-2P (later transferred to the Essex) one F9F-2, three AD-4, two AD-2Q, three AD and one F4U-5N, all remarks concerning Carrier Air Group ELEVEN's activities are summarized on this one page in lieu of the regular report specified in reference (a).

3. During this period of operations, twelve F9F-2's (VF-23), two AD-4N's (VC-11 Det. I) and two AD-4NL's (VC-35 Det. I) from ATC-2, based on USS ESSEX, were temporarily transferred to Carrier Air Group ELEVEN. Primarily, those aircraft were used for CAP, ASP and GATORS. It is significant to mention that just the pilots and planes were transferred. The F9F-2's were maintained by VF-112, the AD-4N's by VC-11 Det. C, and the AD-4NL's by VC-35 Det. C. This system worked very satisfactorily in all respects. On 23 July, twelve F4U-4's (VF-871) landed on board the USS PHILIPPINE SEA and remained over night. These aircraft were maintained by VF-114.

4. The total sorties flown from the USS PHILIPPINE SEA were as follows:

CAP	60	GATOR	9
ASP	9	SPECIAL (Parade, Ferry)	73

5. The photo pilots from VC-61 Det. C and 1st Marine Air Wing with five F2H-2P were transferred from the USS PHILIPPINE SEA to the USS ESSEX on 18 July. Their activities have been included in the action report of the USS ESSEX for this period.

  
J. W. ONSTOTT